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A ssam, which is the mostpopulous state in North East
India, has been facing a number of
movements aiming to achieve a variety of
objectives having both ethnic and
territorial focus. While some of these issues
were partially resolved through the
intervention of the Central government,
several others remain unresolved. The
unresolved conflicts have resulted in a
series of flashpoints. In February 1983,
ethnic riots took place in and around the
village of Nellie killing over 1500 Muslim
peasants of East Bengal origin. As many
as 14 senior government officials, including
a Russian coalmine expert, were abducted
by the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA) from different parts of the state
on July 1, 1991. The Russian coalmine
expert and two other officials were
subsequently killed. The others were
released one after another in exchange for
several jailed ULFA rebels. Thirty-four
train passengers were killed in a powerful
bomb explosion in a Delhi-bound train in
Kokrajhar district on December 30, 1996.
Sanjoy Ghosh, a known social worker, was
abducted and latter killed by ULFA in
1997. In 2003, the Bhutanese government
launched an operation to flush out Indian
armed groups operating on its soil in
which a large number of rebels were either
arrested or killed. More than 100 people
were killed in the violent Kuki-Karbi
conflict in Karbi Anglong district during
2003 and 2004. Sixteen children were
killed in a bomb explosion at the venue of
the Independence Day celebrations at
Dhemaji on August 15, 2004. Nine near-
simultaneous bomb explosions on October
30, 2008 claimed nearly 90 lives and
wounded more than 300 others.
THE ISSUES
Conflicts in Assam are related in one
form or the other to the issues of
immigration, use of and competition over
the control of natural resources, and the
subsequent polarisation of its society and
polity.
The author is an Assistant Professor in the Conflict Resolution Programme at National Institute of Advanced Studies,
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore.
The paper has benefited from the comments by M S Prabhakara and T Khurshchev Singh. None of them, of course, are
responsible for the views presented here.
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1. Immigration
Over the years, one of the biggest
concerns for Assam has been
unauthorised immigration from
Bangladesh and the resultant fears of a
profound demographic transformation of
the state. Most of the conflicts in the state
are related to the complexities of
unauthorised immigration. This issue is
debated not just between Bangladesh and
India; but also within Assam. The
unwillingness of Bangladesh to recognise
Assam’s concerns generated tensions
along the borders on numerous occasions.
Bangladesh has never acknowledged the
presence of its citizens in Assam or in other
parts of India. It even accused India of
evicting ‘Bengali-speaking Muslims’ by
branding them as ‘Bangladeshis’.
Estimates of the number of illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam alone
vary from four million to 10 million. In
the absence of reliable data, the
demographic impact of immigration
remains a highly controversial issue. It led
to an anti-foreigner agitation, popularly
known as the Assam Agitation, between
1978 and 1985, demanding the detection
of all foreigners, their deletion from the
voters’ list, and their deportation. The
agitators demanded the use of the
National Register of Citizens, 1951 to
determine the citizenship of all those living
in the state. The agitation finally
concluded following the signing of the
Assam Accord between the Central
government and the leaders of the
agitation in 1985. The accord promised
to identify and deport all foreigners who
came after March 1971 and to
disenfranchise those who came between
January 1966 and March 1971. However,
the promises remained largely unfulfilled.
Immigration has now become major
electoral issue. In the meantime, nativist-
vigilante groups also periodically launch
campaigns against the alleged
immigrants. Such campaigns have led to
mistrust between the Muslim and non-
Muslim communities, as there are
practical difficulties in determining who
is a foreigner and who is not. Most armed
groups operating in Assam are equally
resentful of the immigration. Although
ULFA is silent on unauthorised
immigration, the silence is more of a
tactical move since Army operations have
forced most of its leaders to reside in
Bangladesh.
2. Natural resources and sons of
the soil
Assam is one of the single largest
producers of natural gas, oil, tea, plywood
and other forest products in the country.
There is a general perception that these
resources are used to benefit people
outside the state more than those in it;
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that the industries based on its natural
resources are located outside; and Assam
is becoming a market for the finished
goods. There was widespread opposition
to the setting up of an oil refinery in
Barauni in Bihar to refine crude oil
extracted from the state. Despite a mass
agitation, the Central government built
the refinery in Barauni. It was after several
further agitations that a refinery was set
up near Guwahati and later another one
at Numaligarh. Likewise, most tea
gardens are owned by the ‘non-locals’ and
the main offices of major tea companies
are located outside the state. In addition,
there is a feeling that the profit from tea
plantations is several times more than the
total revenue received by the state. Similar
allegations prevail in the case of oil.
Further, trade and business is also
controlled by ‘non-locals’. The economic
pressures underlying this perceived
discrimination are accentuated by the fact
that Assam’s economic growth lags
behind that of several other states of the
country. There has thus been a demand
by organisations such as the All Assam
Students’ Union for preferential policies
for the ‘sons of the soil’, especially in areas
of education and employment, that aim
to rid the state of ‘ethnic outsiders’.
3. Ethnic polarisation and assertiveness
Along with the existence of the feeling
of alienation towards the Indian national
mainstream, there also exists ethnic
polarisation and assertiveness within the
state. The non-Assamese communities,
both tribal and non-tribal, have started
questioning the alleged domineering
attitude of the Assamese population.
Earlier several hill areas were detached
from Assam to facilitate the creation of
Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. Now,
the Bodos, a major tribe, often accuse the
Assamese of imposing their language and
culture on the tribals which they term as
a ‘conspiracy’ to assimilate them. The
Bodos also disapproved Clause 6 of the
Assam Accord which promised to
safeguard the cultural identity of the
‘Assamese people’ as they fear the clause
might give legitimacy to the imposition
of Assamese language and culture. Several
tribal groups, one after another, have been
demanding the creation of their own state
to be carved out of the existing Assam.
Such grievances also led to the emergence
of a large number of smaller armed
groups. The competing claims over land
and territory by rival armed groups led
to the outbreak of several ethnic clashes,
the latest one being the Dimasa-Zeme
Naga conflict. The movements for separate
states that were not considered feasible
have been partially resolved by
establishing several tribal councils. But
these policy measures have not stopped
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the desire for more autonomy. After the
anti-foreigner agitation, the Bodos started
an intense agitation for a separate
Bodoland state. That agitation concluded
in 1993 following an agreement with the
state government, resulting in the formation
of the Bodoland Autonomous Council with
a view to provide maximum autonomy to
fulfill the economic, educational, and
linguistic aspirations of the Bodos and other
plains tribes. However, the inability to draw
an acceptable territorial boundary for this
council led to the revival of another phase
of the statehood movement. This gave birth
to a separate brand of conflict led by the
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). Following
the Central government’s intervention, the
BLT agreed to give up the statehood
demand in return for a politico-
administrative arrangement for autonomy
under the Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution of India. Finally, in 2003, the
Bodoland Territorial Council was
constituted. So far nine tribal councils have
been established in response to tribal
demands for more political autonomy. The
existence of these councils, however, does
not guarantee the resolution of tribal
problems. Indeed, it has only aggravated
their posturing for more autonomy. As
expected, the Bodoland Territorial Council
has officially adopted in February 2010 a
resolution demanding a separate state for
the Bodos in Assam.
CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONS
The conflicts in Assam have not only
weakened the institutions of democratic
governance, but have also created new
institutions. Some of these institutions are
socio-political while others are economic.
The socio-political institutions include
armed groups such as ULFA, National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
and United People’s Democratic Solidarity
(UPDS). They have laid down a set of
rules and have the power to enforce them
in selected areas. The economic institution
that has been created by the conflicts is
the taxation mechanism put in place by
these groups. They solicit ‘revolutionary
taxes’ or ‘voluntary contributions’ from
salaried class, businessmen, political class
and contractors. This constitutes a major
source of their funds. A further chunk
of their income is generated from
government sources. Usually, they interfere
in the award of development contracts as
well as at the time of the execution of
those projects. Some of these contracts
have been known to be awarded to
their loyalists from whom they share the
profits.
OPTIONS
The official response to the conflicts
in Assam has been a mix of the use of
force, the promise of accelerated
development, and the Central
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government-initiated peace talks with
armed groups. As a result, a large number
of security personnel are deployed there.
Enormous public resources are being
spent to put Assam’s economic
development on a fast track. Besides, the
Central government also follows the policy
of engaging in peace talks with the armed
groups that agree to resolve their
grievances. However, all these efforts are
only partially successful. The use of force
has only temporarily weakened the
activities of armed groups. The promise
for accelerated development does not
guarantee any significant change on the
ground. Peace talks too have not been all
that successful, except for the one with
the BLT. In 2005, ULFA constituted an
11-member People’s Consultative Group
to prepare the ground for formal peace
talks with the government. Unfortunately,
it pulled out of the peace process in
September 2006 following serious
differences with the government. ULFA is
insisting on the discussion of the
‘sovereignty of Assam’ as one of the
pre-conditions for talks with the
government.
There are other options that have not
received attention they deserve. Civil
society in the state has been consistently
sidelined by the parties in the conflict. In
view of the prolonged crisis where the
parties have not been able to arrive at a
meaningful resolution of the conflict, it is
extremely important for the government
to encourage civil society to facilitate a
meaningful dialogue between the parties.
Efforts must be made to reopen
consultations with the People’s
Consultative Group. The option of
providing temporary ‘safe passage’ to
members of the armed groups on the
occasion of major festivals could be
explored so as to enable them to freely
visit their families and relatives. Tribal
development must be given due
importance for which the successful
working of the tribal councils must be
ensured. Periodic evaluation of the
performance of the tribal councils is
important as their failure is bound to
bring new brands of conflict. Assam
being a multi-ethnic society, solutions
based primarily on ethnic or tribal
considerations often fail. It may be
appropriate to think and advocate
solutions on multi-ethnic considerations.
Finally, apart from tightening border
security and proper border management,
a political consensus is required on
immigration. Good friendly relationships
with neighbouring countries will help
restore normalcy in this region.
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FLASHPOINTS
T he many conflicts in Assamhave resulted in 7366 people
(3917 civilians, 780 security personnel,
and 2669 armed combatants) losing their
lives in conflict-related incidents between
1992 and 2009.1 The conflicts have had
a series of flashpoints that have gained
national, if not global attention.
Nellie massacre of 1983
The massacre at Nellie occurred during
the anti-foreigner agitation. Officially, 1819
people, mostly Muslim peasants of East
Bengal origin, were killed in an attack
organised by rival communities in and
around Nellie village on February 18, 1983.
The victims had participated in the state
elections of 1983 defying a poll boycott.
The boycott was called by those
demanding the holding of the election on
the basis of a revised voters’ list.
Abduction of 14 high-ranking officials
in 1991
Fourteen high-ranking officials,
including a Russian coalmine expert Sergei
Gritchenko, two senior bureaucrats, and
eight Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) officers/engineers, were abducted
by ULFA from different parts of the state
on July 1, 1991. The Russian coalmine
expert and two ONGC engineers were
subsequently killed. The others were
released one after another in exchange for
the release of several jailed ULFA rebels.
Following this incident, the Army-led
counter-insurgency strike, Operation
Rhino, was launched against ULFA.
Bomb explosion in a train in 1996
Thirty-four train passengers were
killed and several others wounded in
a powerful bomb explosion in the
Delhi-bound Brahmaputra Mail Express
at Sesapani in Kokrajhar district on
December 30, 1996.
Abduction and killing of Sanjoy
Ghosh in 1997
Sanjoy Ghosh, a known social worker
CONFLICTS IN ASSAM
1 South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi.
CONFLICTS IN ASSAM
7
who worked with the people of Majuli, a
river-island, in Jorhat district, was
abducted and later killed in 1997. The
killing was believed to be related to his
exposing widespread corruption in Majuli.
ULFA, on the other hand, charged him
with being an agent of India’s external
intelligence agency, the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW).
Operation All Clear in 2003
In 2003, Bhutan launched a military
strike, Operation All Clear, against Indian
militant groups, such as ULFA and NDFB,
operating in its territory. The Royal
Bhutan Army-led operation centered on
the southern part of that country,
bordering Assam, where rebel camps were
located. More than 30 rebel camps were
reported destroyed, and a large number
of rebels were either arrested or killed. All
those arrested were subsequently handed
over to India. Thereafter, several hundreds
of rebels mostly belonging to ULFA and
NDFB surrendered before the government
in Assam.
Kuki-Karbi conflict of 2003-04
Among the several bloody inter-tribal
conflicts in Assam was the Kuki-Karbi
conflict that occurred during 2003 and
2004 in Karbi Anglong district. More than
100 people were reported killed in
retaliatory violence that involved burning
down of several villages in that district.
Several thousands of families were either
temporarily or permanently displaced.
Bomb blast during Independence Day
celebrations in 2004
Sixteen school-going children were
killed on the spot and more than 50
others wounded in a powerful bomb blast
at Dhemaji town on August 15, 2004. The
blast took place when the children
gathered at the lawn of a local college for
Independence Day celebrations. The blast
was said to be carried out by ULFA for
defying its call for the boycott of
Independence Day celebrations.
Bomb explosions in October 2008
Nine near-simultaneous bomb
explosions (three each in Guwahati and
Kokrajhar, two at Barpeta Road, and one
at Bongaigaon) on October 30, 2008,
claimed nearly 90 civilian lives and
wounded more than 300 others. Nearly
80 kilograms of RDX were reportedly
used in the three blasts at Guwahati.
Such large quantities of RDX had never
been used to carry out any explosions
before. This was one of the worst-ever
terror attacks in the state, and was
suspected to have been the handiwork of
the NDFB-ULFA combine.
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TERRAIN
A ssam is a meeting ground ofdiverse cultural groups such
as the Mongoloid, the Indo-Burmese, the
Indo-Iranian, and the Aryan. Before the
advent of the Ahoms, Assam was ruled
by various dynasties such as Plas, Koches,
Kacharis, and Chutiyas. The Ahoms, who
were said to be a Mongolian tribe from
Thailand, invaded upper Assam in 1236
A.D. despite some resistance from the
Kacharis and the Chutias. Ahom rule
continued for nearly six hundred years till
1826 A.D. It was after the Ahoms that
the land was named ‘Asom’, Assam being
its anglicised form.
The Mughals made several
unsuccessful attempts to conquer the
Ahom kingdom. When Ahom power
started to decline, the Burmese invaded
Assam in 1818. In 1826, the British
intervened. Assam came under British
India after the Treaty of Yandaboo between
the Burmese and the British in 1826. The
area was politically incorporated into a
‘pan-Indian imperial formation’. The
British started tea plantations, coal
mining, established sawmills, and
explored oil. Rail lines were also
constructed to transport these products.
The gradual expansion of these activities
attracted large-scale immigration.
In 1838, Assam was incorporated into
the Bengal Presidency. In 1874, a separate
province of Assam was created with its
capital in Shillong. In 1905, a new
province, East Bengal and Assam, was
created. In 1912, this was reverted to the
old province of Assam and remained so
until 1947. In 1937, self-governing power
was given to Assam. Saiyid Muhammad
Saadulla became the first chief minister.
After 1947, Sylhet district was transferred
to East Pakistan. When the Constitution
of India was adopted Assam became a
state. At that time, except for Manipur
and Tripura, the whole of the North East
region was administratively attached to
Assam. Over the years, Assam has been
bifurcated to facilitate the creation of
several small states. The Naga Hills
district along with Tuensang hill district
was reorganised to form Nagaland in
1963. The Khasi and Jaintia Hills became
Meghalaya in 1972. In 1972, the Mizo
Hills and the North East Frontier Agency
were made union territories and the latter
became full-fledged states of Mizoram and
Arunachal Pradesh in 1987.
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Assam, a land of the hills, valleys, and
rivers, serves as the gateway to the states
of the North East region of India. It is
surrounded by Bhutan and Arunachal
Pradesh on the north; Manipur, Nagaland,
and Arunachal Pradesh on the east; and
Bangladesh, Meghalaya, Tripura, and
Mizoram on the south. It shares 263-
kilometer-long international boundary
with Bangladesh and another 262
kilometers with Bhutan. The transport and
communication network to and from
Assam was severely affected following the
partition of the Indian subcontinent. Since
then Assam has become geographically
isolated from mainland India.
With a total area of 78,438 square
kilometers, it occupies 2.39 per cent of
the Indian landmass and 29.92 per cent
of the North East region. It is connected
to mainland India by a 22-kilometer-long
land corridor passing through Siliguri
town of West Bengal. For administration
convenience, the state is divided into 27
districts. Roughly, one-fourth of its area
comprises the hills, and the rest is the
Brahmaputra valley and the Barak valley.
The hills comprise Karbi Anglong (10,434
square kilometers) and North Cachar
Hills (4,890 square kilometers) districts.
The state is bisected by Brahmaputra that
flows for 725 kilometers before entering
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Table 1: Scheduled Tribes Population of Assam, 2001 Census
Name of the Total Population Percentage of the total










All Scheduled Tribes 3,308,570 100
Population of Assam 26,655,528 -
Notes: *These tribes have very small populations.
Source: Office of the Registrar General, New Delhi.
Bangladesh. It has forest cover (reserved
forest and unclassed forest) of roughly
27,018 square kilometers (or 34.45 per
cent of its area). The land has rich natural
resources such as oil, natural gas, coal,
rubber, and tea.
Assam is a multiethnic land with a
population of 26,655,528 in the 2001
census. It has a population density of
339 persons per square kilometer.
During 1951–2001, it recorded the
highest population growth among all
states in the country. It is inhabited by
three distinct groups of people: the hill
tribes, the plain tribes, and the non-
tribal population of the plains. Contrary
to the popular perception outside the
region, tribes in Assam constitute just
about 12.4 per cent of its population.
The plain tribes constitute 10.23 per
cent of the total population of the state,
whereas the hill tribes constitute just
2.18 per cent.
The economy of Assam is sometimes
referred to as a unique example of ‘poverty
amidst plenty’. In spite of being richly
endowed with abundant natural
resources, it lags behind several other




T he gradual expansion of oiland tea industries during
British rule encouraged large-scale
immigration into Assam. The partition of
the Indian subcontinent also resulted in
large-scale immigration from East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) into Assam,
a trend that continues till today. The
resultant tensions culminated in an
anti-foreigner agitation, popularly called
the Assam Agitation, spearhead by the
All Assam Students’ Union. The agitation
that started in 1979 concluded in 1985
following the signing of the Assam Accord
between the Central government and the
leaders of the agitation on August 15,
1985. Following this accord, leaders of the
agitation formed a political party, Asom
Gana Parishad, which later ruled the state
twice during 1985-1990 and 1996-2001.
The promises made in the accord remain
largely unfulfilled, but the agitation led
to intense ethnic polarisation.
The agitation also coincided with the
emergence of the first ever-organised armed
group in the state with the formation of the
United Liberation Front of Asom in 1979.
Since then, ULFA has emerged as an
influential armed group despite several
Army-led operations being conducted
against it. In September 2005, ULFA made
public the constitution of an eleven-member
People’s Consultative Group, to work out
the modalities for its formal talks with the
Central government. Apart from holding
consultations with several civil society
groups, it held at least three rounds of talks
with representatives of the government. The
efforts however ended without success.
At the same time, an agitation was
started by the All Bodo Students’ Union
demanding a separate state for the Bodos,
leading to the emergence of several
Bodo armed groups. Sporadic violent
clashes also took place between Bodos
and non-Bodos during this agitation. An
agreement was arrived at between the
agitating Bodo leaders and the
government leading to the formation of
the Bodoland Autonomous Council in
1993. But the failure of the council led to
the revival of another round of conflict
spearheaded by the Bodo Liberation
Tigers. It unleashed a reign of terror until
it entered a ceasefire agreement with the
Central government. After prolonged
negotiations, an agreement was arrived at
constituting another autonomous body
HISTORY
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called the Bodoland Territorial Council
under the Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution of India in 2003. Following
this, all the BLT members laid down
arms. The council consists of a general
council and an executive council and
enjoys legislative, executive, and financial
powers in respect of 40 subjects, including
forestry, agriculture, public works,
sericulture, and cultural affairs. Four
contiguous districts of Kokrajhar, Baska,
Udalguri, and Chirang come under the
jurisdiction of the council. Hagrama
Mahilary, the former leader of the now
disbanded BLT, is the current chief of
the council. However, the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland, the only
surviving Bodo armed group, rejected the
peace deal calling it an ‘exercise in
futility’. As was perhaps to be expected,
in February 2010, the Bodoland
Territorial Council passed a resolution
reviving the statehood demand.
In addition, several smaller armed
groups claiming to represent an ethnic or
a tribal group have also become active
since the 1990s, with the objective of
securing either separate states or some
form of autonomy for themselves. Their
competing claims over land and territory
have led to violent clashes. Further,
activities of several Islamic radical groups
have also been noticed. Since 2000,
the Hindi-speaking people have also
become victims of conflicts afflicting the
state.
On its part, the government has
deployed a large number of security
personnel, and a number of counter-
insurgency operations have been
conducted. In the meantime, some armed
groups have suspended their operations
against the government to facilitate peace
dialogues, while new ones have emerged





T he numerous conflicts inAssam have made the state
home to a large number of armed groups.
South Asia Terrorism Portal lists as many
as 38 such groups, three of which are
officially banned, nine others active, and
26 inactive. The conflicts are not confined
to those between the government and the
armed groups, but frequently extend to
those between the ethnic or tribal groups
themselves. ULFA, which grew during the
course of the anti-foreigner agitation, still
remains the most influential group
capable of running a parallel government
in several pockets of the state.
The conflicts in the state tend to be
based primarily on three inter-linked
issues: immigration and its complexities;
natural resources and the sons of the
soil; and ethnic polarisation and
assertiveness.
IMMIGRATION
The single biggest worry for Assam
and its people has been unauthorised
immigration from across the border
with Bangladesh. There is widespread
apprehension among the majority of
the state’s population of a profound
demographic transformation if
immigration continues.
Immigration into Assam is the result
of a variety of push and pull factors.
Factors that push immigrants out of
Bangladesh are primarily economic and
environmental. Apart from being a
populous and a poor country, Bangladesh
is vulnerable to natural calamities, such
as floods, cyclones, droughts, riverbank
erosion, and landslides. Factors that pull
them to India are the economic
opportunities available in Assam or
elsewhere, including the availability of
land; and cultural similarities between the
two neighbours. A porous border
facilitates unhindered Bangladeshi
immigration into Assam. This
controversial issue has been widely
debated both within Assam as well as
between India and Bangladesh. The
reluctance of Bangladesh to recognise
Assam’s concerns has generated tension
between the two neighbours on numerous
occasions. These episodes of tension have
occurred whenever India has tried to
deport alleged immigrants. Bangladesh
denied the presence of its citizens in India
and even accused India of evicting
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‘Bengali-speaking Muslims’ by branding
them as ‘Bangladeshis’.
No one really knows the exact
population of Bangladeshi immigrants
residing in Assam. The conservative
estimates vary from 4 million to 10
million. In 2000, the Government of
India-appointed Task Force on Border
Management estimated about 15 million
Bangladeshis in the country, with about
3 lakh entering clandestinely every year.
Assam’s anxiety is compounded by
the fact that the state recorded a rapid
growth in its population in the post-
Independence era. This led to an anti-
foreigner agitation, popularly known as
the Assam Agitation, spearheaded by the
All Assam Students’ Union between 1978
and 1985, demanding the detection of all
foreigners, their deletion from the voters’
list, and their deportation. The agitators
demanded the use of the National
Register of Citizens of 1951 to determine
the citizenship of all those living in the
state. The agitation concluded following
the signing of the Assam Accord (see
Appendix I) between the Central
government and the leaders of the
agitation on August 15, 1985. The accord
promised to take sufficient measures to
identify and deport all foreigners who
came after March 1971 and to
disenfranchise those who came between
January 1966 and March 1971. The
accord also promised constitutional,
legislative, and administrative safeguards
to protect, preserve, and promote the
culture, social, linguistic identity, and
heritage of the ‘Assamese people’. Besides,
it also promised to renew the Indian
government’s commitment to the speedy
all-round economic development of
Assam, and a commitment to establish
advanced scientific institutions in the
state. But, the identification and
deportation of foreigners, the primary
objective of the agitation, remained
entirely unfulfilled. This was to be
expected as in Assam, determining who
is a ‘foreigner’, that is, an illegal
immigrant, is extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
The Assamese point of view is that
immigration has already transformed its
demography to a large extent. This
apprehension is compounded by the fact
that the state recorded the highest
population growth in the country, of 136
per cent during 1951–2001 as against the
national growth rate of 116 per cent. In
1951–1961, there was a nearly 35 per
cent increase in its population as against
less than 22 per cent nationally. It was
35 per cent in 1961–1971 and 48 per cent
in 1971–1991 (there was no census in
the state in 1981). Its population growth,
however, came down to less than 19 per
cent in 1991–2001. Like several states
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in the country, the growth rate of Muslim
population is also high in Assam. As the
2001 census indicates, the overall Hindu
population was 65 per cent, down from
67 per cent in 1991, whereas the Muslim
population increased to 31 per cent from
28 per cent. Rightly or wrongly, this was
widely attributed to immigration. There
were allegations of the state’s voters’ list
being manipulated to enroll people of
dubious nationality. This allegation used
the fact that the number of voters in
several assembly constituencies in the
state grew more rapidly than the national
average. Between 1994 and 1997, 57
assembly constituencies of the state
recorded increases of over 20 per cent in
the number of voters as against the all-
India average of about 7.4 per cent. Earlier
in 1979, out of the 600,000 voters of
Mangaldoi parliamentary constituency, a
state government-appointed tribunal
detected 45,000 voters as ‘foreigners’.
Immediately after the anti-foreigner
agitation, its leaders launched the Asom
Gana Parishad, which came to power
twice in the state. If the Asom Gana
Parishad wanted the implementation of
the Assam Accord, the United Minorities
Front demanded the scraping of the
accord.
The displeasure of the Assamese is not
confined to immigration from Bangladesh
alone. There is also resentment against those
from the ‘Hindi belt’ of India because they
control trade and business in the state. The
state also employs a large number of
migrants from the ‘Hindi belt’ to work on
low-paying manual jobs. With rising
population and unemployment, Assamese
believe migrants from the ‘Hindi belt’ have
taken away their jobs. Some armed groups
have also chosen to specifically target
Hindi-speaking people. In 2007, ULFA
served notice to ‘all Indians’ who migrated
to Assam. The organization said it had
“appealed to the Hindi-speaking people
that the conflict is running in Assam with
colonial India, so go away from here as soon
as possible.”2 Similarly, in a 20-page booklet
titled A Short History of the Boro People,
NDFB accused the Assam government of
encouraging migrants to overrun “tribal
belts and turn the indigenous population
into minorities in their homeland.” The
booklet claimed that the pro-migrant policy
of the government is responsible for the
deteriorating conditions in tribal areas. The
booklet claimed the primary motive behind
encouraging migration was to create ‘vote-
banks’. It alleged that non-tribals own most
of the tribal land.3
2 ‘India rebels tell Hindi-speakers to leave Assam’, Reuters, January 18, 2007.
3 National Democratic Front of Bodoland, A Short History of the Boro People, 2007.
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NATURAL RESOURCES AND SONS OF
THE SOIL
Being a land rich in natural resources,
Assam is also one of the largest producers
of natural gas, oil, tea, plywood and other
forest products in the country. The state
is said to possess over 1.3 billion tonnes
of crude oil and 156 billion cubic metres
of natural gas reserves, of which about 58
per cent is yet to be explored. Assam
accounts for over 15 per cent of crude oil
production in the country. The state also
has a vibrant tea industry that produces
about 50 per cent of the country’s total
tea output. Tea plantations accounted for
321,319 hectares of the states land in
2007 and the average number of workers
employed daily was about 619,743 in
2006.4
However, the general perception is
that the extensive exploitation of natural
resources has benefited people outside the
state rather than those within it. Most of
the tea gardens are owned by ‘non-locals’
with their main offices being situated
outside the state. Another popular
perception is that the profit from tea
plantations is several times more than the
total revenue received by the state. This
view has some official sanction as well. A
committee appointed by the Assam
government in 1976 stated that “a
comparative study between the gardens
under the four different associations [the
Assam Branch of the Indian Tea
Association, the Tea Association of India,
the Bharatiya Chah Parishad, and the
Assam Tea Planters Association –
Table 2: Tea Production in Assam
(Figures in thousand kgs.)
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8
Assam 453,587 433,327 434,759 435,649 487,487 502,041 511,885 487,497
India 853,923 838,474 878,129 892,965 945,974 981,805 986,427 980,818
Source: Tea Board of India, Kolkata
Table 3: Mineral Production in Assam
Year Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas Limestone
(’000 MT) (’000 MT) (Util ised)(MCM) (’000 MT)
2001–2002 652 5107 1850 480
2002–2003 629 4746 1909 552
2003–2004 738 4571 1999 460
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur.
4 Tea Board of India, Kolkata. http://www.teaboard.gov.in/
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Brahmaputra Valley] reveals that, so far
as the representation of local people in
the managerial cadre (including assistant
managers) is concerned the position is the
worst in respect of the tea gardens under
the Tea Association of India, where 82 per
cent of posts in the managerial cadre have
been held by persons with birthplaces
outside Assam … One striking point to
be noted is that, after change-over to
Indian management, almost all the posts
in the managerial cadre (including
assistant managers) were filled up by
persons from outside the state of Assam
without any open advertisement or
without notifying the employment
exchange.”5
The resentment against ‘non-locals’ is
not only because of the origins of those
who control these resources within Assam
but also because industries were set up
elsewhere in the country using the raw
materials produced in the state. There were
protests against the proposal to set up
an oil refinery at Barauni in Bihar to refine
crude oil extracted from the state. Despite
a mass agitation, the Central government
built the refinery at Barauni. The crude
oil extracted from Assam is transported
through a long pipeline to refine at
Barauni. It was after several rounds of
agitation that a small refinery was set up
near Guwahati and another one at
Numaligarh. It was during this agitation
that the issue of neglect and exploitation
of Assam by the Indian government was
raised. Since then the seed of distrust
between the Centre and the people of
Assam was sown. Although the state earns
a royalty for its crude oil and natural gas,
the general feeling is that the state is not
getting its due share. As a result, the state
government has, from time to time,
demanded the increase in oil royalty.
Before the anti-foreigner agitation, the
state received only Rs. 42 as royalty for
every metric tone of crude oil, whereas the
Centre collected six times as much in
cess.6 In 2003, the Central government
revised the royalty on crude oil to Rs. 850
per metric tonne with effect from April 1,
1998. The royalty paid to the Assam
government was Rs. 1,237.01 crores for
2006-07, Rs. 1426.71 crores for 2007-
08 and Rs. 1300.84 crores for 2008-09.7
This feeling of neglect and exploitation
is reinforced by the fact that the economic
growth of the state during the post-
independence period lags behind several
other states of the country. Since the
5 Government of Assam, Report of the Employment Review Committee, 1976, p. 162.
6 Bhaumik, Subir. 2007. Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change, Working Paper No. 10. Washington:
East-West Center.
7 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Exploration of Crude Oil, December 17, 2009.
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partition of the Indian subcontinent, the
North East region was largely isolated.
Industrial development was severely
affected and agricultural growth has not
been anywhere near its potential. Per capita
state income has remained one of the
lowest in the country. The number of people
living below the poverty line too is one of
the highest among all states. The state has
registered low per capita electricity
consumption, worse even than other states
in the North East. Its literacy rate is again
below the national average. At the same
time, its population has grown rapidly.
The grievances against the alleged
exploitation of natural resources
combined with underdevelopment have
only deepened the feeling of neglect and
exploitation, thus contributing to further
alienation and unrest. Influential
organisations like the All Assam Students’
Union have started demanding
preferential policies for the ‘sons of the
soil’. For example, in August 2009,
student activists gathered at the venue of
the interviews conducted in Guwahati for
the recruitment for an upcoming gas
cracker project at Lepetkata near
Dibrugarh town. They insisted that since
the project was the outcome of the Assam
Accord only local youth must be recruited.
They shouted slogans against the cracker
company’s decision to call only 46 locals
against the 540 advertised posts. The
interview was allowed to continue only
after the authorities assured them that
their demands would be looked into.
ETHNIC POLARISATION AND
ASSERTIVENESS
One of the outcomes of the campaign
against alleged illegal immigrants has
been the growing mistrust between
Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
The immigrants are largely seen by
non-Muslims as belonging to a single,
homogeneous Muslim community. As a
result members of the Indian Muslim
community feel victimised as their
nationality is questioned. This
polarisation has now extended to other
tribal communities as well. The Bodos
also disapproved Clause 6 of the Assam
Accord which promises to safeguard the
cultural identity of the ‘Assamese people’
as they fear the clause might give
legitimacy to the imposition of Assamese
language and culture on the tribals. The
non-Assamese communities, both tribal
and non-tribal, have started questioning
the alleged domineering attitude of the
majority Assamese.
The deepening polarisation of its
society and polity has led to the relations
between its multiple sub-nationalities
being driven along ethnic and communal
lines. The perceived grievances have led
to the emergence of a number of armed
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groups. Several tribal groups, one after
another, have also started demanding the
creation of exclusive administrative units
or separate states to be carved out of
Assam. These demands gain strength
from the fact that the state had earlier
undergone major reorganisation leading
to the creation of several smaller states.
Those statehood demands that are not
considered feasible have been partly
resolved by establishing several
territorially defined tribal councils like the
Bodoland Territorial Council. But these
policy measures have not whetted the
appetite for more autonomy.
After the anti-foreigner agitation, the
Bodos started a vigorous agitation
demanding a separate state in the
northern side of the river Brahmaputra.
That agitation concluded in 1993
following an agreement with the state
government, resulting in the formation of
a self-governing council known as the
Bodoland Autonomous Council with a
view to provide maximum autonomy to
fulfill the economic, educational, and
linguistic aspirations of the Bodos and
other plain tribes. The Council, which
comprised a general council and an
executive council, was empowered to
make bye-laws, rules, and orders for
application within the council area on 38
subjects such as cottage industry, forests,
cultural affairs, irrigation, and so on.
However, the inability to carve out a
clear-cut territorial boundary coupled with
infighting among the Bodo leaders led to
the revival of another Bodoland agitation.
The revival of the statehood agitation gave
birth to a separate brand of militancy led
by the Bodo Liberation Tigers. Later, the
BLT offered a unilateral ceasefire and
agreed to talk to the Central government.
It too gave up the claims for Bodoland,
in return for a politico-administrative
arrangement for autonomy under the
Sixth Schedule of the constitution.
Finally, in 2003, the Bodoland Territorial
Council (Appendix II) was constituted.
Like the earlier one, the Bodoland
Territorial Council has a general council
and an executive council. The council has
legislative, executive, and financial
powers in respect of 40 subjects.
Kokrajhar, Baska, Udalguri, and Chirang
districts fall under its administrative
jurisdiction. It is the third council
constituted under the Sixth Schedule
after the Karbi Anglong Autonomous
Council and the NC Hills Autonomous
Council. Apart from these three, there are
six more tribal councils (non-Sixth
Schedule): Mishing Autonomous Council,
Rabha Hasong Autonomous Council,
Tiwa Autonomous Council, Deori
Autonomous Council, Thengal Kachari
Autonomous Council, and Sonowal
Kachari Autonomous Council.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
20
The existence of these councils,
however, has not guaranteed the
resolution of the problems of the tribes.
Indeed, it has aggravated their posturing
for more autonomy. All the non-Sixth
Schedule councils want to upgrade their
status to a level similar to that of the
Bodoland Territorial Council. At the same
time, the bigger ones like the Bodoland
Territorial Council are demanding
separate states. As was perhaps to be
expected, in February 2010 the Bodoland
Territorial Council officially adopted a
resolution demanding a separate state.
There have also been problems within
these councils. The smaller tribes and
communities within each council allege
that these councils mainly serve the
interests of the larger groups. In the
Bodoland Territorial Council area, there
is an open division between the Bodos
and the non-Bodos. The latter had even
opposed its formation. They accused the
government of succumbing to the ‘gun
culture’ of the Bodo rebels. Competing
claims over land and territory by rival
armed groups was also a major cause for
inter-tribal as well as tribal-non tribal
conflicts.
There were at least two such conflicts
that had a violent fallout. The Kuki-
Karbi Conflict was one of the bloodiest
inter-tribal conflicts. It rocked Karbi
Anglong district in 2003–04 killing more
than 100 people and scores of remote
villages were reduced to ashes. The Kuki-
affiliated Kuki Revolutionary Army
(KRA) and the Karbi-affiliated Karbi
Longri NC Hills Liberation Front
(KLNLF) were both responsible for the
outrage. Both the groups wanted separate
homelands for the tribes they claim to
represent. The Karbis, a major tribe in the
district, want a separate state as against
the Kukis demand for a tribal council.
But, the Karbis see the Kukis as
‘migrants’ from Manipur. The latest such
conflict was the Dimasa-Zeme Naga
conflict of 2009. It claimed more than
50 lives and displaced several others,
either temporarily or permanently. The
Dimasas, a major tribe in the NC Hills
district, want a separate state. On the
other hand, the Nagas, though a smaller
number in the district, have a similar
ambition in the form of Greater Nagalim.





T he decades-old conflicts inAssam have generated their
own institutional mechanisms. Some of
these institutions are socio-political while
others are economic. Among the socio-
political institutions are the armed groups
who lay down a set of rules and have the
means and resources to enforce them in
areas where their writ runs. The economic
institution is the taxation mechanism put
in place by various armed groups. These
new institutional practices interfere with
and hence weaken the institutions of the
state. Once the institutions of the state
are weakened, the armed groups exploit
the situation to their advantage.
SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The socio-political institutions are
specific to different groups though they
have some common features. It is useful
to look at these institutions as they have
emerged in each group.
UNITED LIBERATION FRONT OF
ASOM
Organised armed conflicts in Assam
started with the formation of ULFA in
1979. It claims to be a revolutionary
political organisation to liberate Assam
through armed struggle from the ‘clutches
of the illegal occupation of India’; and to
establish a sovereign independent Assam.
It believes in a ‘federal Assam’; and also
claims, “Ours is not a movement for the
Asomiya (Assamese), and ours is a
movement for the Asombashis (dwellers
of Assam)”.8 It insists that Assam was
never a part of India; and the relationship
between the two is ‘colonial’. It boycotts
all national events like Republic Day and
Independence Day celebrations since it
does not believe in the Constitution of
India.
Its emergence was closely related to
the use of and competition over the control
of natural resources, unauthorised
immigration from Bangladesh, and
underdevelopment of the state. With its
leadership, under pressure from Army
action, being forced to take refuge in
Bangladesh it has in recent years been
keeping silent on unauthorised
immigration. It has shifted its focus to
8 Bhaumik, Subir. 2007. Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change, Working Paper No. 10. Washington:
East-West Center.
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other immigrants (especially Hindi-
speakers) who it sees as the ‘real threat’
to Assam. ULFA accused the Central
government of large scale exploitation of
natural resources and blamed it for the
lack of development in the state. Being
the most influential group, ULFA has been
virtually running a parallel government
in several pockets of the state. During the
first Asom Gana Parishad government
(1985–1990), ULFA enjoyed a near free
run as the then government was widely
believed to be sympathetic to it.
ULFA is organised into a political
wing and a military wing. The former is
headed by a chairman and the latter by a
commander-in-chief. The military wing is
known to be more influential than the
political wing, and is reported to consist
of four battalions. Further, for operational
purposes, ULFA is divided into a Central
Unit, a District Unit and an Anachalik
Unit, with the former being the top
decision-making body. It was believed
that at its peak ULFA maintained about
5000 regular soldiers, and also enjoyed
huge public support. But that has
drastically weakened over the years.
Its propaganda mouthpiece,
Swadhinata (also known as Freedom) is
widely circulated. It maintains regular
contact with the local press to present its
side of the story. It also maintains good
working relationships with a number of
like-minded organisations of the region
and beyond. During its formative stage,
it secured support from National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and Kachin
Independent Army (KIA) for training and
arms procurement. Subsequently, it
started clandestine operations from
neighbouring countries; and came into
contact with Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) of Pakistan. Since then, it relies
heavily on ISI for training, sophisticated
arms, and other logistics.
BODO GROUPS
The Bodo groups began with political
mobilisation for a separate state. Initially
the agitation was spearheaded by the All
Bodo Students’ Union, an influential
Bodo student organisation, that
mobilised the Bodos against what they
called ‘Assamese chauvinism’. In 1987,
it gave a highly exclusivist slogan ‘Divide
Assam-fifty-fifty’. During that period,
certain armed groups such as Bodo
Volunteer Force (BVF) and Bodo Security
Force (BdSF) were also emerged and
extended tactical support to the Bodoland
agitation. When the All Bodo Students’
Union agreed to settle for a tribal council
in 1993, in lieu of a separate state, the
BVF was dissolved and its volunteers
came over-ground. The BdSF, then
renamed as the NDFB, continued its
struggle with the stated objective of
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securing a ‘sovereign Bodoland’ (Free
Bodoland).
When the first council failed to deliver
on its designated responsibilities, a group
of Bodo youth raised another armed
group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers in 1996.
Suddenly, the Bodo region of Assam was
thrown into a quagmire of violence,
including bombings of trains and
organised ethnic riots. The BLT entered
into a ceasefire with the Central
government in 1999, and later another
council, with enhanced powers and
functions, was formed in 2003. Thereafter,
members of the BLT launched a political
party called Bodo People’s Front,
participated in elections, and is currently
ruling the Bodoland Territorial Council.
It is also a coalition partner of the present
Congress-led state government. Some of
its functionaries have been elected to the
council, headed by its former leader
Hagrama Mahilary. Several of its former
members have been recruited in the state
police and other paramilitary forces.
The only surviving Bodo armed group
is the NDFB, now split into two factions,
in which one of them is currently observing
a temporary ceasefire with the government.
OTHER SMALLER GROUPS
This category includes several small
armed groups claiming to represent an
ethnic or a tribal group. Notable ones
among them are the Dima Halim Daogah
(DHD), Black Widow (BW), United
People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS),
Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front
(KLNLF), Kuki Revolutionary Army
(KRA) and Muslim United Liberation
Tigers of Assam (MULTA). Most of them
have been demanding separate states.
Organised armed conflict among the
Dimasa tribe started in the 1980s with the
objective of securing a separate state, and
is led by DHD and BW. Territories claimed
by the Dimasas for a separate state called
Dimaraji comprise whole of NC Hills
district, parts of Karbi Anglong district and
Nagaland. The DHD is currently holding
a temporary ceasefire with the Central
government. At the same time, several BW
rebels have either surrendered or been
arrested. Another organised armed
movement among the Karbis was initiated
in the 1990s with the objective of securing
a separate state and is led by UPDS and
KLNLF. The former is currently holding a
ceasefire with the government. Several
Muslim armed groups also emerged
around 1990-96. Security analyst Jaideep
Saikia listed 16 Islamic armed groups
operating in the state that included Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jehad.
MULTA is the most active. Very little
information is openly available on their
activities and objectives, but most of them
are inclined to protect the interests of the
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Muslim community. Some observers allege
that they indulge in propaganda for a
separate Islamic homeland, and a society
based on Islamic values. In addition, some
Naga and Kuki armed groups from the
neighbouring states of Manipur and
Nagaland have also started operating, on
a small scale, in some areas of Assam.
Except for ULFA, the rest have limited
influence outside their ethnic or tribal
groups. All of them have working
relationships with like-minded groups.
Most of them are small with a few leaders
and their followers. Smaller groups
normally acquire arms as well as training
from the bigger ones. Any group, either
big or small, is capable of influencing
public opinion to a large extent in their
area of operations.
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
The armed groups regularly collect taxes
from salaried class, business community,
politicians and contractors. Major business
establishments and oil and tea companies
are the prime target. This is then further
extended to the common people.
Another component of their income
is generated from government sources.
There have been allegations of
departments of the government diverting
their budgetary allocations to the armed
groups. These groups are capable of
interfering in the award of development
contracts as well as at the time of their
execution. They also put pressure on
officials of the state to award some of
these contracts to their loyalists so that
the profits can be shared. In order to avoid
any risk, the officials are compelled to
associate with them clandestinely. Over
the years, this partnership has grown
alarmingly. ULFA’s monthly collection in
the 1990s was estimated at about Rs. 1.5
crore. HN Das, a former senior bureaucrat
of Assam, has argued that a major portion
of such funds seem to have come
indirectly from government sources.
According to Das, extortionists could
easily blackmail corrupt officials because
they knew of their illegal activities. Rural
development, according to Das, is a
‘lucrative sector’ and as much as 70 per
cent of all the funds available to the state
government were systematically siphoned
off under an organised network of ULFA,
former ULFA (locally known as SULFA),
contractors, civil servants and politicians.
Quoting unspecified sources, he estimated
that of the total Rs. 11.65 billion made
available under various rural development
schemes in Assam during the period
1992–1993 to February 1998, less than
Rs. 4 billion went to legitimate schemes.9
9 Das, H.N., Economic Consequences of Insurgency in Assam, The Indian Police Journal, LV (1), January-March 2008, p. 72.
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In such an environment, many
development projects have been either
delayed or sometimes abandoned
abruptly due to insecurity. A case in point
is the 201-kilometer-long Silchar–
Lumding Broad Gauge Conversion
Project, sanctioned in 1996 with a budget
of Rs. 648 crore. The project came to a
halt due to the interference and frequent
violence committed by Dimasa groups in
the NC Hills district. This project was
earlier scheduled to be completed in 2006,
was then extended to 2009, resulting in
cost escalation to Rs. 1823 crore.




T he official response to theconflicts in Assam has been a
mix of the use of force, the promise for
accelerated development and Central
government-initiated peace talks with the
armed groups. The state was declared a
‘disturbed area’ and the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958, was imposed.
As a result, a large number of security
personnel are being deployed there. Some
of the armed groups have been notified
as unlawful organisations. From time to
time, a number of Army-led counter-
insurgency strikes, such as Operation
Rhino and Operation Bajrang, have been
launched against them. The Unified
Command, a three-tier command
structure of the Army, the Assam Police
and the Central paramilitary forces, has
been overseeing the counter-insurgency
operation since 1997. The command,
headed by the state chief minister, holds
periodic reviews of the security situation.
Being a Special Category State
coupled with ongoing conflicts, enormous
public resources are being spent to put
its economic development on a fast track.
Unfortunately, these funds could not be
fully utilised for the benefit of the state.
In the absence of systematic monitoring,
these funds can be used to benefit a small
section of society that consists of armed
groups, officials of the state, and
contractors.
Besides, the Central government also
follows a policy of engaging in peace talks
with any armed group that agrees to
adjure violence. The DHD (since 2003),
UPDS (since 2002) and a faction of NDFB
(since 2004) are observing a suspension
of operations agreement with the
government. At the same time, the state
government has managed to strike peace
deals with some of the smaller groups. On
February 11, 2010, 419 KLNLF rebels
formally laid down arms at Diphu, the
headquarters of Karbi Anglong district,
and the government promised to give Rs.
2 lakh each as a one-time grant for their
rehabilitation. The government also
promised to release Rs. 50 crore for the
development of the Karbi Anglong
district. Earlier on October 2, 2009, more
than 400 BW rebels also laid down arms
at Halflong, the headquarters of NC Hills
district. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi who
attended the surrender ceremony
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promised to release Rs 50 crore for
immediate developmental activities in the
NC Hills district. Also in 2008, the United
Liberation Front of Barak Valley (ULFBV)
surrendered en masse.
The experience of negotiating with the
bigger groups provides us insights into how
the process works. The BLT started direct
negotiations with the Central government
that lasted about four years, in which it
agreed to drop the statehood demand as
the government promised to fulfill their
other demands with an arrangement under
the amended Sixth Schedule of the Indian
Constitution by creating an autonomous
self-governing council. The BLT became
the first armed group of Assam to
successfully complete peace parleys with
the government. A Memorandum of
Settlement (MoS) was signed between the
BLT and the Central government in New
Delhi in February 2003. The successful end
to the negotiations witnessed one of the
largest surrender ceremonies in the country
in December 2003, when 2641 BLT rebels
along with more than 500 sophisticated
weapons bade farewell to arms. Thereafter,
BLT formed a political party and is
currently ruling the Bodoland Territorial
Council.
In September 2005, ULFA made
public the constitution of an eleven-
member People’s Consultative Group, to
work out the modalities for their formal
peace talks with the Central government.
It was headed by eminent litterateur
Mamoni Raisom Goswami and noted
footballer Rebati Phukan as ‘facilitators’.
Operations against ULFA were suspended
in August 2006 for about a month. The
group held at least three rounds of talks
with the government. The government
insisted on a written commitment from
ULFA authorising the participation of its
topmost leaders in the talks. On its part,
ULFA insisted on the inclusion of the
‘sovereignty of Assam’ as one of the
conditions. Finally, the People’s
Consultative Group pulled out of the
peace process in September 2006.
In 2008, a section of ULFA, locally
known as ULFA-pro-talk group, declared
a unilateral ceasefire without any
preconditions defying its top leaderships.
This section accused its top leaders of not
being interested in a negotiated
settlement, and also claimed that their
ceasefire was aimed at exerting pressure
on their top leaders to initiate
unconditional talks with the government.
Their move was, however, summarily
rejected by its top leaders who insisted
that there could be any peace talks
without discussing the issue of
sovereignty. This development exposed
their internal dissent and the government
was not in favour of initiating talk with
this section.
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Meanwhile, the chairman and a key
architect of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa,
was arrested from an unspecified location
in Bangladesh in November 2009 and
handed over to India. Most of its senior
leaders are now in the custody of the state
government, but, according to government
sources, its commander-in-chief, Paresh
Barua, is taking shelter somewhere in the
Kachin-China border inside Myanmar.
NEW OPTIONS
1. Civil society as facilitator
In view of the prolonged crisis where
conflicting parties have not been able to
arrive at a meaning resolution of the
conflict, it would be advisable for the state
to go a step forward, encourage and
support civil society to act as a ‘facilitator’
for a meaningful dialogue between the
conflicting parties. This is possible since
the state has a strong civil society network.
The first prerequisite is to encourage and
engage them positively. With their
support, it would be much easier to bridge
the existing differences that exist between
the state and the non-state armed groups,
and also the conflict of interests between
the armed groups themselves. If civil
society in neighbouring Nagaland could
persuade the warring NSCN factions to
narrow their differences in the overall
interests of the Naga society, the same
could be attempted in Assam as well. It
is, therefore, important to reopen
consultations with the People’s
Consultative Group, which was
constituted by ULFA. All the members of
the People’s Consultative Group are
influential persons who have excelled in
various walks of life. Once ULFA is
brought to the dialogue table, the
involvement of foreign hands in the
current crisis will be weakened. Further,
peace in the Bodo region is also unlikely
unless NDFB shun violence. Bodo civil
society could help persuade NDFB to
accept and cooperate in the affairs of the
Bodoland Territorial Council. Over time,
the NDFB has slightly softened its
opposition to this council.
2. Safe passage and rehabilitation
The option of providing temporary safe
passage to members of the armed groups
on the occasion of major festivals, like
Bihu, could be initiated so as to enable
them to freely visit their families and
relatives. This would help in building
goodwill, and also show the sincerity of
the government. Along with this, there is
also a need for an effective rehabilitation
policy for the surrendered insurgents like
that of the Jammu & Kashmir or Andhra
Pradesh. This would certainly help in




3. Periodic review of the working
of the tribal councils
Assam has altogether nine tribal
councils. However, the performance of
most of these councils has never been
satisfactory right from their inception.
Periodic elections to most of them, though
mandatory, have never been held on time.
Their overall performance has also not
been satisfactory. There are allegations of
funds being misused. Their failure will
only generate violence and unrest. That
happened in the case of the first Bodo
council; and the same could happen with
others too. A committee of experts could
be constituted by the state government
for each of them to periodically assess their
performance and suggest remedial
measures.
4. Focus on multi-ethnic solution
and non-territorial autonomy
Assam is a multi-ethnic society.
Hence, solutions to problems primarily
based on particular ethnic or tribal
considerations often backfire. It may be
appropriate to think and advocate
solution to problems on multi-ethnic
considerations. One way to satisfy the
aspirations of various tribal groups while
preserving the territory of Assam could
be by establishing regimes of non-
territorial autonomy. This type of
autonomy might be granted to all
members of particular group across
different states. It could include a
representative legislative body and an
executive component. The scope of such
autonomy could extend over areas like
religion, culture, language, and other
welfare matters. This model of autonomy
assumes significance in view of the need
to counter territory-specific demands,
such as that of the Greater Nagalim or
Bodoland.
5. Strengthen measures to control
illegal immigration
Peace in Assam is unthinkable unless
a compromise formula is arrived at on the
issue of illegal immigration from
Bangladesh. It is likely to remain the key
source of future conflict. The campaign
against illegal immigration has already
generated conflict, not only between
immigrants and the local population, but
also among groups of the local population
as well. Apart from tightening border
security and proper border management,
a political consensus is required on the
issue. Assamese fear of becoming minority
in their own land must be acknowledged.
6. Renewed engagement with
neighbouring countries
Armed conflict in the region is, in one
form or the other, linked to neighbouring
countries as many of the armed
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combatants have been taking shelter
there. Good friendly relations with the
neighbours will significantly help the
government resolve to restore normalcy
in this part of the country. So far however
only Bhutan has responded to India’s
concerns by launching an operation
against Indian armed groups operating
from its soil.
7. Tribal development
Much of the pressure for separate
states has come from the tribals believing
their interests are not protected in Assam.
There are several demands by tribal
groups for the creation of more states. In
order to discourage such tendencies, tribal
development must be given due
importance for which successful working
of the tribal councils must be ensured.
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The following are the texts of the Assam
Accord - 1985 signed between students’
representatives from the state of Assam
and the government officials in the
presence of then Prime Minister, Republic
of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.
1. Government have all along been most
anxious to find a satisfactory solution
to the problem of foreigners in Assam.
The All Assam Students’ Union
(AASU) and the All Assam Gana
Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) have
also expressed their keenness to find
such a solution.
2. The AASU through their Memorandum
dated 2nd February 1980 presented to
the late Prime Minister Smt. Indira
Gandhi, conveyed their profound sense
of apprehensions regarding the
continuing influx of foreign nationals
into Assam and the fear about adverse
effects upon the political, social, culture
and economic life of the state.
3. Being fully alive to the genuine
apprehensions of the people of Assam,
the then Prime Minister initiated the
(APPENDIX I)
Assam Accord, 19851
dialogue with the AASU/AAGSP.
Subsequently, talks were held at the
Prime Minister’s and Home Minister’s
level during the period 1980-83.
Several rounds of informal talks were
held during 1984. Formal discussions
were resumed in March, 1985.
4. Keeping all aspects of the problem
including constitutional and legal
provisions, international agreements,
national commitments and
humanitarian considerations, it has
been decided to proceed as follows:
FOREIGNERS ISSUE
5.1 For purposes of detection and deletion
of foreigners, 1.1.1966 shall be the
base data and year.
5.2 All persons who come to Assam prior
to 1.1.1966, including those amongst
them whose names appeared on the
electoral rolls used in 1967 elections
shall be regularised.
5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after
1.1.1966 (inclusive) and upto 24 th
March, 1971 shall be detected in
accordance with the provisions of the
1 Courtesy: All Assam Students' Union
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
32
Foreigners Act, 1946 and the
Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964.
5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will
be deleted from the electoral rolls in
force. Such persons will be required
to register themselves before the
Registration Officers of the respective
districts in accordance with the
provisions of the Registration of
Foreigners Act, 1939.
5.5 For this purpose, Government of India
will undertake suitable strengthening
of the government machinery.
5.6 On the expiry of a period of ten years
following the date of detection, the
names of all such persons which have
been deleted from the electoral rolls
shall be restored.
5.7 All persons who were expelled earlier,
but have since reentered illegally into
Assam shall be expelled.
5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or
after March 25, 1971 shall continue
to be detected, deleted and practical
steps shall be taken to expel such
foreigners.
5.9 The Government will give due
consideration to certain difficulties
expressed by the AASU/AAGSP
regarding the implementation of the




6. Constitutional, legislative and
administrative safeguards, as may be
appropriate shall be provided to
protect, preserve and promote the
culture, social, linguistic identity and
heritage of the Assamese people.
7. The Government take this
opportunity to renew their
commitment for the speedy all round
economic development of Assam, so
as to improve the standard of living
of the people. Special emphasis will
be placed on education and science
and technology through
establishment of national institutions.
OTHER ISSUES
8.1 The Government will arrange for the
issue of citizenship certificates in
future only by the authorities of the
Central Government.
8.2 Specific complaints that may be made
by the AASU/AAGSP about irregular
issuance of Indian Citizenship
Certificates (ICC) will be looked into.
9. The international border shall be
made secure against future infiltration
by erection of physical barriers like
walls, barbed wire fencing and other
obstacles at appropriate places.
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Patrolling by security forces on land
and rivering routes all along the
international border shall be
adequately intensified. In order to
further strengthen the security
arrangements, to prevent effectively
future infiltration, an adequate
number of check posts shall be
set up.
9.2 Besides the arrangements mentioned
above and keeping in view security
considerations, a road all along the
international border shall be
constructed as to facilitate patrolling
by security forces. Land between
border and the road would be kept
free of human habitation, wherever
possible. Riverine patrolling along the
international border would be
intensified. All effective measures
would be adopted to prevent
infiltrators crossing or attempting to
cross the international border.
10. It will be ensured that relevant laws
for prevention of encroachment of
government lands in tribal belts and
blocks are strictly enforced and
unauthorized encroachers evicted as
laid down under such laws.
11. It will be ensured that the relevant
law restricting acquisition of
immovable property by foreigners in
Assam is strictly enforced.
12. It will be ensured that Birth and Death
Registers are duly maintained.
RESTORATION OF NORMALCY
13. The All Assam Students’ Union
(AASU) and the All Assam Gana
Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) call off
the agitation, assure full co-operation
and dedicate themselves towards the
development of the country.
14. The Central and the State
Government have agreed to:
♦ review with sympathy and
withdraw cases of disciplinary
action taken against employees in
the context of the agitation and
to ensure that there is no
victimization;
♦ frame a scheme for ex-gratia
payment to next of kin of those
who were killed in the course of
the agitation;
♦ give sympathetic consideration to
proposal for relaxation of upper
age limit for employment in public
services in Assam, having regard
to exceptional situation that
prevailed in holding of academic
and competitive examinations,
etc., in the context of agitation in
Assam;
♦ undertake review of detention
cases, if any, as well as cases
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against persons charged with
criminal offences in connection
with the agitation, except those
charged with commission of
heinous offences;
♦ consider withdrawal of the
prohibitory orders/ notifications
in force, if any.
15. The Ministry of Home Affairs will
be the nodal Ministry for the
implementation of the above.
Signed/- (P.K. Mahanta), President, All
Assam Students’ Union
Signed/- (R.D. Pradhan), Home Secretary,
Govt. of India
Signed/- (B.K. Phukan), General
Secretary, All Assam Students’ Union
Signed/- (P.P. Trivedi), Chief Secretary,
Govt. of Assam
Signed/- (Biraj Sharma), Convenor, All
Assam Gana Sangram Parishad
In the presence of
Signed/- (Rajiv Gandhi), Prime Minister
of India
Date: 15th August, 1985, Place: New Delhi
1. Election Commission will be
requested to ensure preparation of fair
electoral rolls.
2. Time for submission of claims and
objections will be extended by 30
days, subject to this being consistent
with the Election rules.
3. The Election Commission will be
requested to send Central Observers.
Signed/- Home Secretary
1. Oil refinery will be established in
Assam.
2. Central Government will render full
assistance to the State Government
in their efforts to re-open: Ashok Paper
Mill and Jute Mills.
3. I.I.T. will be set-up in Assam.
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The Government of India and the
Government of Assam have been making
concerted efforts to fulfill the aspirations
of Bodo people relating to their cultural
identity, language, education and
economic development. Towards this end,
a series of talks were held between
Government of India, Government of
Assam and Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)
since March, 2000. As a result, it is agreed
to create a self-governing body for the
Bodo areas in the State of Assam as
follows:
2. Objectives
The objectives of the agreement are :
to create an autonomous self governing
body to be known as Bodoland Territorial
Council (BTC) within the State of Assam
and to provide Constitutional protection
under Sixth Schedule to the said
Autonomous Body; to fulfill economic,
educational and linguistic aspirations and
the preservation of land-rights, socio-
cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos;
and to speed up the infrastructure
development in BTC area.
(APPENDIX II)
Memorandum of Settlement with BLT, 20032
3. Area
3.1 The area of the proposed BTC shall
comprise all the villages and areas
as per Annexure-I to be so notified
by the State Government. The above
mentioned villages and areas shall
be divided into 4 contiguous
districts after reorganisation of the
existing districts of Assam within a
period of 6 months of the signing of
the agreement on the lines of the
proposal given by BLT subject to
clearance of the Delimitation
Commission.
3.2 A Committee comprising one
representative each from
Governments of India & Assam and
BLT will decide by consensus on the
inclusion of additional villages and
areas in the BTC from out of villages
and areas given in Annexure-II on
the basis of the criteria of tribal
population being not less than 50%,
contiguity or any other agreed
relevant criteria within a period of
three months of signing of this MoS.
2 Courtesy: Bodoland Territorial Council
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4. Status of Bodoland Territorial
Council
The provision of the Sixth Schedule
and other relevant Articles of the
Constitution of India will apply to BTC,
mutatis mutandis in terms of this
agreement. The safeguards/modifications
for the non-tribals in BTC area, inter-alia,
will include the followings:
4.1 Provisions of para 1(2) of Sixth
Schedule regarding Autonomous
Regions will not be applicable to
BTC.
4.2 A provision will be made in para
2(1) of the Sixth Schedule for
increasing the number of members
for BTC up to 46 out of which 30
will be reserved for Scheduled Tribes,
5 for non-tribal communities, 5 open
for all communities and 6 to be
nominated by Governor of Assam
from the unrepresented communities
from BTC area of which at least two
should be women. Nominated
members will have the same rights
and privileges as other members,
including voting rights. Election from
the 40 constituencies of BTC shall
be on the basis of adult franchise.
The term of the elected members of
BTC shall be for 5 years.
4.3 Safeguards for the settlement rights,
transfer and inheritance of property
etc. of non-tribals will be suitably
incorporated in para 3 of the Sixth
Schedule. Any such law may be made
by the BTC in this regard will not,
in particular:
a) extinguish the rights and
privileges enjoyed by any citizen
of India in respect of his land
at the commencement of BTC,
and
b) bar any citizen from acquiring
land either by way of
inheritance, allotment,
settlement or by way of transfer
if such citizens were eligible for
such bonafide acquisition of
land within the BTC area.
4.4 Provision will be added in para of
Sixth Schedule that in BTC area,
language and medium of instruction
in educational institutions will not
be changed without approval of the
State Government.
4.5 Provisions of para 8 of Sixth
Schedule regarding power to assess
and collect land revenue and impose
taxes shall be applicable to BTC.
4.6 Para 10 of the Sixth Schedule will
not be applicable to BTC area.
4.7 Provisions of Article 332(6) of the
Constitution will be so modified that
the existing status of representation
of BTC area in the State Assembly
is kept intact. After the creation of
BTC, the Parliamentary and
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Assembly Constituencies shall be
delimited by the Delimitation
Commission in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
4.8 In the event, Panchayati Raj system
ceases to be in force in the Council
area, the powers of the Panchayati
Raj Institutions in such matters
shall be vested with the Council.
The amendments to the Sixth
Schedule shall include provisions in such
a manner that non-tribals are not
disadvantaged in relation to the rights
enjoyed by them at the commencement
of BTC and their rights and privileges
including land rights are fully protected
5. Powers and Functions
5.1 The Council shall have legislative
powers in respect to subjects
transferred to it as enumerated at
Annexure-III. All laws made under
this paragraph shall be submitted
forthwith to the Governor and until
assented to by him, shall have no
effect. The BTC shall have executive,
administrative and financial powers
in respect of subjects transferred to
it.
5.2 There shall be an Executive Council
comprising of more than 12
Executive Members, one of whom
shall be the Chief and another one
the Deputy Chief of the said
Executive Council. There shall be
adequate representation for the non-
tribal members in the Executive
Council. The Chief and the Deputy
Chief of the Council shall have the
status equivalent to the Cabinet
Minister and the other Executive
Members equivalent to the Minister
of State of Assam for protocol
purposes in BTC area.
5.3 The BTC shall have the full control
over the officers and staff connected
with the delegated subjects working
in the BTC area and shall be
competent to transfer these officers
and staff within the BTC area. ACRs
of these officers shall also be written
by the appropriate BTC authority.
5.4 BTC shall also be competent to
make appointments for all posts
under its control in accordance with
the rules of appointment followed by
the Government of Assam. However,
the posts, where recruitment is made
on the recommendation of APSC,
shall not be covered under this
provision. The Council may
constitute a Selection Board for
appointments to be made by it and
may also make rules, with the
approval of the Governor of Assam,
to regulate appointments and to
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ensure adequate representation for
all communities living in the Council
area.
5.5 No posts shall be created by BTC
without concurrence of the
Government of Assam and it shall
also abide by the decision of the
Government of Assam in respect of
abolition of temporarily keeping
vacant any post.
5.6 Development functions and bodies
within the competence of BTC shall
be transferred to BTC. In respect of
DRDA, concurrence of Government
of India will be obtained.
5.7 The offices of the Deputy
Commissioners and Superintendent
of Police will be outside the
superintendence and control of BTC.
5.8  The State Government would
provide an amount, to be decided
every year on population ratio basis,
as grants-in-aid in two equal
installments to the BTC for
executing development works. The
proportionate share for the BTC
shall be calculated on the basis of
the Plan funds available after setting
aside the funds required for
earmarked sectors and the salary.
This amount may be reduced
proportionately if the state plan
allocation is reduced or there is plan
cut due to resource problem. In
addition, the Council will be paid a
suitable amount plan funds and
non-plan funds to cover the office
expenses and the salaries of the staff
working under their control. The
BTC shall deserve the salaries of the
staff under their control and would
ensure strict economy in the matter.
5.9 BTC authority shall prepare a plan
with the amounts likely to be
available for development works,
both under state share and central
share, covering any or all the
activities of the departments under
their control. The Council shall have
full direction in selecting the
activities and choosing the amount
for the investment under the same
in any year covering all groups of
people in a fair and equitable
manner. This plan will be a sub set
of the state plan and would be
treated as its integral part. Once the
plan of the state, including BTC
plan, gets the approval of the
Planning Commission, the BTC
authority shall start execution of
their plan in BTC area.
Modifications, if any, made by the
Planning Commission in the BTC
proposal, shall be binding on the
BTC authority. The State
Government shall not divert the
funds allocated to the BTC to other
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heads and also ensure its timely
release. BTC may have Planning
Department to prepare the plans for
BTC area to be submitted to
Planning Commission through the
Government of Assam.
5.10 The executive functions of the BTC
shall be exercised through its
Principal Secretary who shall be
an officer of the rank not below
that of Commissioner/Secretary to
Government of Assam. The
sanctioning powers of the
Government of Assam shall be vested
with the Principal Secretary of BTC
and sanctioning powers of head(s)
of the department(s) including for
technical sanction shall be conferred
on the senior most officer of the
department preferably not below the
rank of Additional Director, who may
be designated as Director of BTC for
that department. The Principal
Secretary and other officers shall
exercise their powers under the
overall guidance and supervision of
BTC.
6. Law and Order
To strengthen the Police
Administration, Government of Assam
shall appoint an IGP for the four districts
of BTC and the jurisdiction of the DIG,
Kokrajhar shall also be modified to cover
these four districts.
7. Revision of List of ST
Consequent to the inclusion of BTC
area into the Sixth Schedule, the list of
ST for the State of Assam shall be so
modified, so as to ensure that the tribal
status of Bodos and other tribals living
outside the BTC area does not get affected
adversely.
8. Grant of ST Status to Bodo-
Kacharis of Karbi Anglong and
NC Hills Districts
The Government of India agrees to
consider sympathetically the inclusion of
the Bodo-Kacharis living in Karbi-
Anglong and NC Hills Autonomous
Council area in the ST (Hills) List of State
of Assam
9. Development of Bodo Language
9.1 The Government India agrees to
consider favourably the inclusion of
Bodo language in Devnagri script in
the Eighth Schedule of the
Constitution.
9.2 Bodo Language shall be the Official
Language of BTC subject to the
condition that Assamese and
English shall also continue to be
used for official purposes.




10.1 The State Government, within the
limitation of financial and other
constraints, may offer or allow the
Council to offer, possible and
sustainable additional incentives
for attracting private investment in
the Council area and would also
support projects for external
funding.
10.2 In order to accelerate the
development of the region and to
meet the aspirations of the people,
the Government of India will
provide financial assistance of
Rs.100 Crores per annum for five
years for projects to develop the
socio-economic infrastructure in
BTC areas over the above the
normal plan assistance to the State
of Assam. The size of the Corpus
will be reviewed after a period of
five years. Suitable mechanism will
be build in the system to ensure
that the funds are transferred to
BTC in time and at regular
intervals. An illustrative list of
projects which may be considered
to be taken up in BTC area is at
Annexure-IV.
10.3 Government of India will provide
necessary one time financial
assistance required for development
of administrative infrastructure in
the newly created district
headquarters, sub-divisional
headquarters and block
headquarters, besides the BTC
Secretariat Complex at Kokrajhar.
11. Centrally Funded University
11.1 A centrally funded Central Institute
of Technology (CIT) will be set up
to impart education in various
t e c h n o l o g i c a l / v o c a t i o n a l




11.2 The CIT will be subsequently
upgraded to a centrally funded
State University with technical and
non-technical disciplines to be run
by the BTC.
12. Relief and Rehabilitation
12.1 The BLT would join the national
mainstream and shun the path of
violence in the interest of peace and
development. After the formation
of the Interim Council of BTC,
BLT will dissolve itself as an
organisation and surrender with
arms within a week of swearing-in
of the interim council. The State
Government would provide full
support to relief and rehabilitation
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of the members of BLT who would
surrender with arms in this process
in accordance with the existing
policy of the state. Financial
support in such cases, however,
shall be limited to be provisions of
the scheme prepared and funded by
the Government of India.
Withdrawal of cases against such
persons and those related to over
ground Bodo movement since
1987 shall be considered according
to the existing policy of the State
of Assam.
12.2 The Government of India will
initiate steps for review of action
against the Bodo employees of
Government of India and
subordinate offices as well as in
respect of Central Government
undertakings. Similar action would
be taken by the Government of
Assam.
12.3 Bodo youth will be considered for
recruitment in Police, Army and
Para-Military Forces to increase
their representation in these
forces.
13. Special Rehabilitation
Programme for the People
Affected by Ethnic Disturbances
The Special Rehabilitation
Programme (SRP) for the people affected
by ethnic disturbances in Assam, who are
at present living at relief camps in
Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon etc. shall be
completed by the Government of Assam
with active support of BTC. Necessary
funds for their rehabilitation shall be
provided by the Government of India and
lands which are free from all
encumbrances required for such
rehabilitation shall be made available by
the BTC.
14. Interim Council
Immediately after signing of the
agreement, Interim Executive Council
for BTC shall be formed by Governor of
Assam from amongst the leaders of the
present Bodo movement, including the
signatories to this settlement, and shall
include adequate representations to the
non-tribal communities in BTC area.
The Interim Council shall not continue
for a period beyond 6 months during
which period election to the Council
shall be held. Government of Assam
shall dissolve the Bodoland
Autonomous Council (BAC) and repeal
the BAC Act.
15. Government of Assam will consider
inclusion of all tribals including
Bodos in RHAC/MAC/LAC in
consultation with leaders of these
Councils.
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16. The implementation of the
provision of the Memorandum of
Settlement shall be periodically
reviewed by a Committee
comprising representatives of
Government of India, Government
of Assam and BTC.
(Signed on February 10, 2003 at
New Delhi by the representatives of Bodo
Liberation Tigers, governments of India
and Assam in the presence of Shri L. K.
Advani, Hon’ble Deputy Prime Minister





All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad. 1980.
The Foreigner’s Problem: An Analysis,
Guwahati.
All Assam Students’ Union. 1980. Foreign
Nationals’ Issue: The Facts, Guwahati.
All Bodo Students’ Union. 1987. Why
Separate State of Bodoland: Demand and
Justifications, Kokrajhar.
All Bodo Students’ Union. 2001. Bodoland
Movement 1986-2001, Kokrajhar.
Barua, Sanjib. 1999. India Against Itself,
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Barua, Sanjib. 2007. Durable Disorder:
Understanding the Politics of Northeast
India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Barpujari, H.K. 1998. India’s North-East:
Problems, Policies and Prospects since
Independence, Guwahati and New Delhi:
Spectrum Publication.
Barpujari, HK (ed.). 2004. The
Comprehensive History of Assam, Vol. V.
Guwahati: Publication Board Assam.
Bhattacharya, Chandana. 1996. Ethnicity
and Autonomy Movement, New Delhi: Vikas
Publishing House.
Bhaumik, Subir. 2007. Insurgencies in
India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option &
Change. Working Paper No. 10, Washington:
East-West Center.
Chaube, S.K. 1999. Hill Politics in Northeast
India, New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Cline, Lawrence E. 2006. The Insurgency
Environment in Northeast India, Small Wars
and Insurgencies, 17(2), pp. 126–147.
Das, Amiya Kumar. 1982. Assam’s Agony:
A socio-economic and political analysis.
New Delhi: Lancers Publications.
Das, H.N. 2008. Economic Consequences of
Insurgency in Assam, The Indian Police
Journal, L(1), January-March 2003.
Gohain, Hiren. 2007. Chronicles of Violence
and Terror: Rise of United Liberation Front
of Assam. Economic and Political Weekly,
42(12), pp. 1012–1018.
Gohain, Hiren. 2008. Once More on
Ethnicity and the North East, Economic and
Political Weekly, 43(21), pp. 18–20.
Government of India. 2009. Annual Report
2009, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.
Hussain, Monirul. 1993. The Assam
Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity.
New Delhi: Manak Publications.
Kumar, Praveen. 2004. Karbi–Kuki Clashes
in Assam, Strategic Analysis, 28(2), pp. 352–
357.
Kumaran, K.P. 2003. Evaluation Study on
the Pattern of Flow and Utilisation of Funds
by the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
44
in Assam, Guwahati: National Institute of
Rural Development.
Misra, Tilottoma. 1980. Assam: A Colonial
Hinterland, Economic and Political Weekly,
15(32), pp. 1357-1364.
Prabhakara, M.S. 1975. Visitations,
Economic and Political Weekly, 10(8), pp.
349–351.
Rustomji, Nari. 1983. Imperiled Frontiers:
India’s North-Eastern Borderlands, New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Saikia, Jaideep. 2002. The ISI Reaches East:
Anatomy of a Conspiracy. Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 25, pp. 185–197.
Saikia, Jaideep. 2004. Terror Sans Frontier:
Islamic militancy in Northeast India. New
Delhi: Vision Books.
Sarin, V.I.K. 1980. India’s North-East in
Flames. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
SATP. 2010. South Asia terrorism Portal,
New Delhi. http://www.satp.org/.
Van Schended, Willen. 2005. The Bengal
Borderland; Beyond State and Nation in
South Asia, New Delhi: Anthem Press.
Singh, M Amarjeet. 2004. Assam: Challenges
Before Bodo Territorial Council, Economic
and Political Weekly, 39(8), pp. 56–57.
Talukdar, Sushanta. 2006, Politics of
Migration, Frontline, 23(25).
Tea Board of India. 2010. Tea Board of India.
Kolkata. http://www.teaboard.gov.in/.
Trivedi, V.R. 1995. Documents on Assam,
New Delhi: Osmos Publications.
Upadhyay, Archana. 2005. Assam: The
‘Infiltrator’ Issue, Economic and Political
Weekly. 40(28). pp. 3002–3003.
Upadhyay, Archana. 2006. Terrorism in the
Northeast: Linkages and Implications,
Economic and Political Weekly. 41(48). pp.
4993–4999.
Verghese, B.G. 2004. India’s Northeast
Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency,
Governance, Development. New Delhi:
Konark Publishers.
Weiner, Myron. 1978. Sons of the Soil:
Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
